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Commentary
Julio J. Rotemberg
The second shock considered by King and
Lin is a shock to government purchases, and this
shock too affects ye
t and νt. Because neither of
these shocks affects ωt in the (PS) equation, it is
apparent from the inspection of (PS) and (IS) that
these shocks are consistent with keeping inflation
constant and output, yt, equal to the efficient level,
ye
t. What is needed for such a policy is simply
that the nominal rate of interest be set equal to a
constant inflation rate, π –, plus νt. Such a policy,
particularly when coupled with a low value for
π –, appears desirable from several different points
of view (not the least that it avoids many of the
distortions introduced by price rigidity). I thus
agree with King and Lin that it provides a natural
benchmark against which other interest rate rules
can be judged.
While it is a good benchmark, it seems difficult
to implement such a rule in practice because the
Wicksellian natural rate of interest, νt, is generally
not observable right away. This difficulty pro-
vides a rationale for rules where the interest rate
responds to the economy’s history. Two of the
rules considered in this paper are based on the
equation
(2)
where yt* is a measure of trend output. With τ1 =
1.5 and τ2 = 0.5, this is the rule that Taylor (1993)
shows to be similar to actual U.S. policy. King and
Lin also consider a variant where τ1 remains equal
to 1.5 and τ2 is set to zero. Because the central
bank responds only to inflation and not to out-
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he King and Lin (2005) paper analyzes
the desirability of various interest rate
rules in a standard model of sticky
prices. A simplified version of this
standard model consists of (PS), a price-setting
rule, and (IS), an investment-equals-savings curve.
These can be written as
(PS)
(IS) 
where πt, it, yt represent the observable inflation
rate, nominal interest rate, and log of output at t,
respectively; ye
t  represents the efficient level of
output; and ωt and νt represent stochastic 
disturbances.
The paper considers a monetary authority that
sets interest rates as a function of the economy’s
history and evaluates how these rules perform
when the economy is subject to two types of
shocks. The first of these shocks is a technology
shock. This shock affects at in the production
function
(1)
where nt and kt represent the labor input and
capital, respectively. Such a shock obviously
affects the efficient level of output, ye
t . In general,
it would also affect νt—that is, the real interest
rate that is consistent with ensuring that the effi-
cient level of output, ye
t , is demanded at t, given
that the efficient level of output will be demanded
in the future.
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         put in this latter rule, King and Lin call it an
“inflation only” rule.
The paper spends some time discussing mon-
etarist concerns. Monetarists criticized policies
that kept interest rates stable on the ground that
they would lead government purchase shocks
(or, rather, IS shocks in general) to have too large
an effect on output. Policies that stabilized money
growth, they argued, would lead interest rates to
increase in response to such shocks and thereby
stabilize output.
Inspired by these concerns, King and Lin ask
themselves whether the interest rate rules that
they consider lead to excessive output stability
or not. It is important to stress, though, that the
monetarists critique was applied to attempts by
the monetary authority to stabilize interest rates,
whereas interest rates vary over time in the rules
studied by King and Lin. An even more important
difference between the framework underlying
the monetarist analysis and that of King and Lin
is that the former saw the stability of output as
desirable, whereas the latter focus on a model
where even changes in government purchases
ought to lead to changes in output.
These differences are sufficiently large that
the issue of whether a particular interest rate rule
“destabilizes output” relative to the benchmark
turns out to be quite different from the issue of
whether this particular interest rate rule is desir-
able in terms of leading to an outcome that is close
to the benchmark. The inflation-only rule, in
particular, “destabilizes output” in the sense that
the failure of interest rates to rise immediately
when there is a positive shock to government
purchases leads output to rise by more than it
would under the benchmark rule. By contrast,
the Taylor (1993) rule “stabilizes output” in the
sense that its tendency to let interest rates rise
when output is above its trend leads output to
respond less to both government purchases and
to technology shocks than it does in the bench-
mark for both.
At the same time, the inflation-only rule leads
to paths of output that are quite close to those of
the benchmark, particularly in response to tech-
nology shocks. Thus, this rule appears more desir-
able than rules that let interest rates respond to
output as well, even though there is a sense in
which the inflation-only rule “destabilizes” out-
put. This is not altogether surprising. King and
Lin focus on a setup where output ought to vary
(with ye
t ), while inflation ought to be stable, and
it thus makes sense that a rule that focuses only
on inflation stabilization is superior to one that
tries to stabilize output as well.
The question this raises, however, is whether
the output fluctuations one would actually
observe in the economy if inflation were stabilized
would correspond to fluctuations in the efficient
level of output, ye
t . The combination of equations
(PS) and (IS) is silent on this issue because of the
existence of ωt. Fluctuations in ωt lead to fluctu-
ations in inflation even in the case where output
is equal to ye
t  so that, naturally, they would imply
undesirable output fluctuations if monetary policy
were able to stabilize inflation. Thus, as empha-
sized by Giannoni and Woodford (2003), fluctua-
tions in ωt justify efforts by the central bank to
stabilize output.
This renders it important to ascertain the
extent to which the economy is subject to the
shocks to technology and government purchases
studied by King and Lin and the extent to which
the economy is subject instead to shocks to ωt.
Equations (IS) and (PS) cannot, by themselves,
be used to make this judgment because they do
not separately identify the roles of νt, ye
t , and ωt.
However, it would seem possible to use informa-
tion on actual government purchases to identify
fiscal shocks and information from an aggregate
production function, such as (1), to identify
technology shocks.
There is indeed an extensive literature seeking
to measure the effect of fiscal shocks on aggregate
activity (see Blanchard and Perotti, 2002, for a
relatively recent example). One issue in this litera-
ture is that some components of government
spending, and particularly those related to the
welfare state, respond to fluctuations in gross
domestic product (GDP) that are due to other
causes. However, changes in military purchases
in the United States after World War II are plau-
sibly free from this problem, and Rotemberg and
Woodford (1992) use these changes to construct
a measure of government purchase shocks. They
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follow these shocks are broadly consistent with
those of a competitive model where markups are
constant. On the other hand, they also show that
real wages increase after an increase in military
purchases, and this suggests that increases in
military purchases lower markups.
By contrast, King and Lin’s simulations show
that when the monetary authority uses a Taylor
rule, markups strongly rise. The reason is not hard
to understand. In the standard neoclassical model
as well as the King and Lin model, the principal
reason output rises in response to an increase in
government purchases is that this increase makes
people feel poorer and increases their labor supply
(reduces their consumption of leisure). There is
thus downward pressure on real wages and on
prices. The downward pressure on prices tends
to translate into increased markups when prices
are sticky, particularly if the monetary authority
raises interest rates in response to increases in
output.
One reason to be skeptical of this mechanism
is that it requires that workers/consumers respond
to shocks to their future wealth, and there is con-
siderable evidence that people often do not adjust
their consumption until their flow of income
changes. Insofar as shocks that increase govern-
ment purchases do not lead to immediate
increases in taxes, the reduction in the flow of
income is deferred and this might well also defer
the increase in labor supply.
This argument as well as the evidence of
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) concerning the
response of real wages both suggest that the
increase in output that follows government pur-
chase shocks may well be due to reductions in
desired markups. This would mean that such
shocks affect ω and might thus justify a monetary
policy that is geared toward output stabilization.
The identification of technology shocks pres-
ents substantial difficulties. An approach that is
known to be problematic is to equate technological
change with computed Solow residuals. The
problem is that short-term changes in the Solow
residuals and movements in output induced by
nontechnological factors can be connected through
several mechanisms, including variations in labor
effort and the existence of increasing returns to
scale. A potentially more-promising method for
detecting changes in the technology factor, at, is
to use information about changes in the long-run
level of output or labor productivity. Galí (1999)
and Galí and Rabanal (2005), in particular, use a
bivariate vector autoregression (VAR) that includes
changes in hours and labor productivity and
identifies technology shocks as those shocks that
are orthogonal to the shocks that have no long-run
effect on the level of productivity. Given the speci-
fication, these shocks clearly do affect productivity
in the long run. The technology shocks identified
by this method are initially followed by declines
in hours. Because hours and output move together
over the business cycle, it appears that this method
does not give an important role for technology
shocks in business fluctuations.
A source of concern with this method of
identifying technology shocks is that a bivariate
VAR in hours and productivity growth has diffi-
culty explaining long-term changes in productiv-
ity growth. In the U.S. nonfarm business sector,
the compound annual growth rate of productiv-
ity was 2.75 percent from 1947:Q1 to 1973:Q4,
whereas it was 1.66 percent from 1974:Q1 to
1992:Q4. To see whether Galí and Rabanal’s (2005)
statistical model is consistent with this, I first
estimated a VAR explaining changes in nonfarm
hours and nonfarm productivity from 1949:Q2
to 2002:Q4 using four lags of the two variables.
Using these estimated parameters, I generated
10,000 histories of the two endogenous variables
by randomly generating residuals that had the
same variance covariance matrix as those of the
estimated VAR. For each history, I computed the
compound rate of growth of labor productivity
from observation 1 to observation 107 as well as
the compound rate of growth from observation
108 to observation 183. The maximum difference
between these two compound rates of growth
across these 10,000 histories was 0.4 percent,
which is considerably below the 1.1 percent dif-
ference in compound growth rates observed in
the data between the first and second periods
described here previously.
This difficulty with a bivariate VAR in first
differences echoes some of the well-known diffi-
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down. One way of capturing this slowdown is to
suppose that there was a break in the economy’s
mean growth rate at some point in the early 1970s.
This would imply that the population of the
United States suffered a huge wealth loss at that
time. Given the lack of a precipitous reduction
in asset prices at the time, the idea that the econ-
omy’s underlying rate of growth fell suddenly is
not wholly convincing. An alternative view is to
suppose that technological progress is much
smoother.
This is the approach taken in Rotemberg
(1999, 2003), where I fit a smooth trend, dt, to
output by minimizing
(3)
where the parameter yt is the output level at t and
λ is set at the lowest possible value that ensures
that
(4)        
The resulting trend is quite smooth and has
two additional properties. The first is that the
covariance of the cycle (the difference between
yt and dt) at t and t –k is small. For k = 16, this
ensures that cycles are essentially over after four
years. The second property is that the cycle at t
is orthogonal to the deviation of the trend at t from
the average of its values at t + v and t –v. This
ensures that the trend does not behave in a way
that is similar to that of the cycle itself.
Rotemberg (2003) shows that a process for
technical progress that is consistent with micro-
economic evidence on diffusion lags generates
movements in GDP that are quite similar to those
of the trend that is constructed by this method.
This means that, if technical progress does indeed
take this form, stabilizing output relative to trend
becomes a valid goal for monetary policy once
again. On the other hand, the computation of
trend output, yt*, may well be complicated in this
case. In particular, Orphanides and van Norden





























tk tk yd ∑ − () −− ,
to compute in real time when yt* is smooth and
yet different from a linear trend.1
This raises the question whether, in practice,
the Federal Reserve has had difficulty dealing with
recent episodes of changes in technical progress.
While a thorough answer to this question is well
beyond the scope of this comment, it is worth
studying briefly the increase in productivity that
took place in the United States in the 1990s. The
idea is to see whether allegiance to a monetary
rule of the type used by Taylor (1993) to describe
actual Federal Reserve practice caused difficulties
when technical progress accelerated in the 1990s.
To see that it could, note that (2) leads to a system-
atic relation between inflation, the real rate of
interest, and the departure of output from y*. In
particular, treating inflation in adjacent periods
as being essentially equal to πt, it yields
(5)
Over long periods of time, one would not
expect the central bank to have much influence
on the real interest rate, which appears on the
right-hand side of this equation. Moreover, in line
with the King and Lin model, one would expect
a rise in productivity growth induced by technical
progress to raise this real rate. In practice, it seems
that trend real rates fell over the 1990s, however.
If one applies the detrending method of Rotemberg
(1999) to the real interest rate based on Treasury
bill rates and the consumer price index (CPI) from
1981:Q1 to 2003:Q4, one finds that the trend real
rate fell from 2.52 percent per annum in 1991:Q1
to 1.35 percent per annum in 1999:Q2. To compute
the change in yt – yt*, I use Taylor’s (1993) method
for obtaining yt*. This involves the fitting of a
linear trend for the logarithm of real GDP from
1984:Q1 to 1993:Q2. The result is that  yt – yt*
went from being –1.8 percent in 1991:Q1 to 3.9
percent in 1999:Q2. Using (5), this increase in
“cyclical” output over nine years, together with
the corresponding reduction in the trend real rate
of interest, ought to have lowered the inflation
rate by about 8 percent per year. In practice, the
12-month CPI inflation rate was essentially the
same in 1991:Q1 as it was in 1999:Q2.
ππ tt t t t ii y y = −− () −− () 2 ** .
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1 For a proposal for dealing with this problem, see Orphanides and
Williams (2002).The precise numbers that belong in the above
calculation are obviously subject to a great deal
of uncertainty. It remains the case, however, that
the “natural real rate of interest,” νt, appears to
have declined in the 1990s, whereas “cyclical
output” would have increased a great deal if a
naive linear trend had been used to compute the
“natural” level of output. The use of a mechanical
rule setting interest rates as a function of inflation
and a naive measure of cyclical output would thus
have tended to reduce inflation considerably.
That inflation remained stable suggests that the
Federal Reserve was able to deal effectively with
these underlying changes in the economy. One
reason for this may have been that, in spite of the
difficulties noted by Orphanides and van Norden
(2002) for the computation of trend output in real
time, the Federal Reserve was able to obtain an
accurate reading of this particular trend change.
Insofar as the central bank can be counted on to
track changes in trend output accurately, and
insofar as technical progress affects only such
trends, efforts at stabilizing cyclical output are
more likely to be beneficial.
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